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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
From  the  late  1980s,  the natural  gas  extraction  in the  Netherlands  has  experienced  an  increasing  number
of ever  stronger  gasquakes  (induced  earthquakes  due  to gas  extraction).  This  paper  offers  a  security
analysis  of  the  accompanying  debate  on  the  material  consequences  and  organization  of the  gas  extraction
between  the  threatened  local  population,  the  knowledge  institutes  analyzing  the gasquakes,  and  the
government  and  extraction  industry.  This  paper  studies  how  these  parties  make  sense  of  the  gasquakes
through  a  combination  of securitization  theory  and the  ﬂat  relationality  offered  by  new  materialism,
which  forces  the  two  conﬂicting  securitization  claims  to be  analyzed  in their  local  sociotechnical  and
material  context.  The  resulting  analysis  shows  how  the gas  debate  is structured  by a shared  security
of  supply  understanding.  An  understanding  which  for  a long  time  has  been  questioned  by  the  localnowledge politics
ecurity logics
population  on  its safety  and cost  implications.  However,  it took  25 years  until  their claims  were  accepted
and  the  security  of supply  understanding  shifted  to a focus  on minimal  extraction  volumes.  An acceptance
that can only  be explained  through  a self-reinforcing  combination  of  security  claims,  actual  material
events,  increasing  measurements  (following  security  calls),  shifting  value  judgements  and  increasing
audience  acceptance  (creating  additional  speech  actors).
Publi©  2016  The  Author(s).  
. Introduction
The Netherlands has been developing natural gas ﬁelds since the
iscovery of a large ﬁeld in the region of Groningen in the 1950s. By
015, this has resulted in 275 billion euro of state revenue as well as
n infrastructure that connects almost all of the Dutch households
o these gas ﬁelds for heating and cooking purposes. Simultane-
usly, the Groningen gas ﬁeld is drained to roughly one-third of
ts original low caloriﬁc reserves (680 of its original 2800 billion
3). Unfortunately, from the mid-1980s onwards the areas above
he ﬁelds have experienced light earthquakes, which have been
ncreasing in magnitude and frequency (Fig. 1). For local residents,
he everyday experience and (potential deadly) consequences of
hese earthquakes are conﬂicting with the long-standing national
conomic and security of supply concerns of the Dutch govern-
ent and European energy markets. For a long time, the concerns
or earthquakes remained limited to a small number of Gronin-
en inhabitants. This changed with the 2012 Huizinge earthquake,
E-mail address: j.kester@btech.au.dk
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214-6296/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articleshed  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
which, as the strongest and most heavily experienced earthquake
in the Groningen area to date, led to a large public debate and a
string of reports on all aspects of the Dutch natural gas extraction
and ultimately to a cap on extraction as of 2014. Consequently, the
question is, why, after years of neglect, the security concerns of
an initially small number of local residents suddenly superseded
the energy security concerns of policy makers and energy schol-
ars working on the Dutch gas and energy supplies. In other words,
this paper studies the security politics behind an understanding of
energy security.
Within the literature, energy security has been described as a
‘slippery’, ‘fuzzy’ and ‘multidimensional’ concept [1,2]. Deﬁnitions
vary widely, but simultaneously often share common points of
interest building around notions of security of supply, vital systems,
and environmental and economic energy (in)security concerns
[3,4]. As such ‘the energy security concept nicely weaves together
disparate policy issues into one basket ([5] p. 152).’ Consequen-
tially, the discussion on how energy security is used and deﬁned
seems ultimately a context bound one [1,6]. As Pasqualetti ([7] p.
278) remarks in his reﬂection on a two-day meeting of 40 energy
security experts: ‘Any discussion of energy security must recognize
that it varies from one place and one culture to another, especially at
the household level’. This is resolved in multiple ways. More tradi-
tional historical and geopolitical policy analyses draw conclusions
 under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).






































eFig. 1. Groningen Earthquakes and
ource: After NAM [39,50], with data from KNMI [40] and NAM [39,50]
rom the debates they describe [8,9]. Another prevalent approach is
o map  and develop the range of indicators and metrics used to ana-
yze energy security [3,10,11]. In a similar line, Cherp and Jewell ([6]
. 334), two strong proponents of a contextual approach, conﬁrm
he importance of ‘social reality in shaping perceptions of truth’
nd identify a range of story lines about energy security, which
hey then categorize into a framework that can be used for further
nalysis.
Elsewhere, they argue that ‘energy security is an instance
f security in general’ ([84] p. 415) and thus needs to inquire
bout the often taken for granted values and assumptions behind
nergy security. This paper follows the notion that energy security,
hether deﬁned by scholars or as a shared understanding of par-
icipants, is part of a wider political spectrum. However, instead of
eﬁning what energy security is, it approaches the context bound
ature of energy security by studying how it works. How one of
ts elements, in this case security of supply, becomes what those
nvolved understand it to be, how it changes over time and how it
hapes debates about energy production, transport and consump-
ion in the meantime. ‘The need for empirical investigation into the
amiﬁcations of using (. . .)  energy security [claims], for what pur-
ose and by whom ([5] p. 153)’ is not a new question, but due to its
elatively small sample size remains an imperative one. Within the
nergy security literature it is studied mainly from a constructivist
erspective on language and discourse [12,13] or from Securitiza-
ion Theory [5,14–18].
The discussion below builds on these studies in two ways. First,
he gasquake debate offers an analysis of a central energy security
oncept, security of supply, in its broader societal context [15]. As
uch, it does not study competing understandings of energy secu-
ity [5] or the linguistic construction of a speciﬁc energy security
nderstanding [12,17]. Instead it shows how the Dutch security
f supply understanding is inﬂuencing the debate and in turn is
haped by the resistance it faces coming from the safety concerns
f the local population. This repetitive interaction between these
wo security concerns builds on a broader relational understanding
hat is at the heart of this paper. It is a relationality that, second,
xtends the discursive focus above by incorporating ideas of securi-ction Volume until October 2015.
tization into the ﬂat relationality offered by New Materialist studies
[19–21], in particular Actor-Network Theory [22,23]. A ﬂat rela-
tionality puts the shared understandings of security of supply and
safety on an equal footing to the materiality of the earthquakes
and the models used by the knowledge institutes. In other words,
it reduces the analytical importance of the security claims by forc-
ing the observer to study the security claims as part of their wider
constantly changing context.
The analysis itself builds on media coverage, news briefs, (court)
statements and a number of reports, among them the 2015 report
by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) on the decision-making process
behind the Dutch natural gas extraction from 1959 until 2014 [24].
Although the debate is still ongoing, this paper focusses speciﬁcally
on the period following the Huizinge earthquake in 2012 up to the
autumn of 2015, as by then most of the major policy changes had
taken place, including the decision to cap the extraction volume
[25].
This paper continues in Section 2 with an explication of the the-
ory and subsequent contribution of this paper. Section 3 introduces
the Huizinge earthquake and its consequences. Besides a discussion
of the gasquake itself, this section touches in particular on a report
from the main regulatory body, the State Supervision of Mines
(SSM), which studied the Huizinge earthquake and shows how
it is this report that actually shifted the value judgement behind
the assessments of the decision-makers. Section 4 discusses the
internationally encapsulated position of the gas-industrial com-
plex, while Section 5 looks more closely at the safety and security
claims of the locals. Section 6 moves on to discuss the knowledge
politics behind the earthquakes in order to highlight the struggle
over the uncertainty behind the scientiﬁc models and how secu-
rity considerations play a role in this process. The reﬂection brings
these lines together.
2. Contextualizing security as part of a situated and ﬂat
performative relationality
This paper and the gasquake debate offers four main additions




























































o4 J. Kester / Energy Research &
he distinction between security and politics. Second, it offers a
ong-term illustration that enforces a dynamic securitization anal-
sis. Third, by placing security of supply in opposition to safety
rguments, this debate not only studies two competing securitiza-
ion processes but also places the resistance against current energy
xtraction practices in a Western context (contrary to insights
rom development studies on mining in Latin-America or Africa
26]) with an immediacy and geographical focus that is not always
resent when energy security is for example studied in relation to
limate security. Lastly, the debate studies this immediacy itself
nd how it increased overtime by analyzing the security claims in
elation to the actual gasquakes and the scientiﬁc knowledge about
hem. The reinforcing interaction between these elements and the
ctual material presence of the qasquakes (Sections 3 and 6) sup-
orts the theoretical argument that security should be placed in a
at relationality.2
First, during the review of this article, the question was raised
hether the below offered a discussion of energy security or
nstead was about energy politics.3 The relation between security
nd politics has in fact long been a core issue within critical secu-
ity studies, and one that is gaining traction once again [27,28].
t stands at the center of Securitization Theory, developed in the
990s, which sees security as a category separate from regular
olitical and non-political issues ([14] pp. 23–24). In this theory,
ecurity is reserved for those extraordinary issues, like war, where
n existential threat is believed to exist and extraordinary action
re taken without concern for other social parties (e.g. outside nor-
al  political and economic routines) ([14] p. 26). Energy security
oes not often fall in that category and if it does it is subject to eco-
omic, climate, or military security ([14], [15] pp. 509–510; [17] p.
4). In this sense a discussion on energy security (contributing to
ts concepts and theories) as removed from a discussion on energy
olitics makes little sense as the former is always part of the latter
nd − as per the question above − the interaction itself deserves
loser study.
This is reﬂected in other security theories, where the distinc-
ion is more conﬂated. For instance, in Foucault’s biopolitics [29] or
he security practices literature [30] security is not taken as a sepa-
ate exceptionality but as a thoroughly routinized political process
losely linked to knowledge practices (the ways people try to gain
nowledge of the world) and the exercise of power. While these
hree theories approach the relation between security and politics
ifferently, all share the view that security acts as a call for urgency
ased on distinctions between friend and enemy, safe and unsafe,
isk and no risk, insecurity and security [31]. They also share an
nderstanding that threat images are performative. First, because
he wording of these threats help shape the world we  live in by
eﬁning an event (in doing so not only deﬁning the event or enemy,
ut also oneself and the (referent) object in need of security). And
econd, because people act in the present to prevent these imagined
uture realities and through these acts materialize an alternative
uture.4 On a political level, this implies that policy makers, schol-
rs and other actors are not only responsible for a failure to counter
hreats, but also for the threats that they propose themselves: for
he distinctions between friend/enemy, the choice of what to pro-
ect, and for the resources drawn from other areas in terms of actual
esources and agenda setting ([32]p. xiii).
2 This comes with a strong moral responsibility for the observer, as it is s/he who
ecides what to study as part of this relationality or network [85].
3 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this up.
4 These insights are related to a performative reading of energy security (see also
86]), where actors are seen to be directed in how they approach the world by earlier
ractices and understandings, and subsequently, when acting (re)produce those or
ther new social and material practices and effects.al Science 24 (2017) 12–20
Second, this paper also moves beyond the static nature of Secu-
ritization Theory with its implicit focus on a security claim made
by a speech actor towards a single audience [33,34]. With its focus
on the speech act, the moment when a (securitizing) actor identi-
ﬁes and presents a future event as a threat and subsequently asks
the audience for support to counter it, the theory is predicated to
single acts from the perspective of the speech actor. While it would
be fairly simple to write the Groningen gasquake debate solely in
terms of the local population securitizing their safety concerns, it
would offer a description of one actor (a representative of the local
population) who  calls for the threat (future consequences of more
gasquakes) in the hope to convince the respective audience (deci-
sion maker). However, the illustration below shows how both the
speech actor and the audience were not single entities and that
they constantly evolved, as the growing audience acceptance of
the gasquake threat subsequently meant a growing mass of speech
actors, each calling for the gasquake threats in their own  way and
wording (see Section 5).
Third, even though a more dynamic long term reading of Secu-
ritization Theory would pick up on this, it would still only focus on
one event and its accompanying security claim (the threat of future
gasquakes). While there is some work done on conﬂicting energy
security claims and interpretations [16] and competing security
claims are one of the main reasons for issues to lose their urgency
[35], most of the work done on how energy security relates to other
concerns sees energy security as subject to military and economic
concerns (above) or involves negotiations in line with the energy
trilemma [36]. In contrast, the gasquake debate offers a case with
two active security processes. A case where the securitization of
the safety concerns interacts with the (institutionalized) security of
supply concerns that dominate the debate.5 For even though secu-
rity of supply considerations often remained implicit, as the debate
primarily focused on safety concerns, compensation and extrac-
tion volumes, it was central to it. For the governing bodies and gas
industry, for whom security of supply was one of the core reasons to
continue with business as usual. And subsequently, it was also cen-
tral to the local population, for whom security of supply presented
the boundary of what they could achieve. Irrespective popular calls
for a complete halt of extraction, on a political and legal level the
argument revolved around safe extraction and a minimalization of
volumes (see Section 5). In doing so, the negotiations and subse-
quent actions of the actors involved reproduced security of supply
as a central motif, but with a redeﬁned understanding of what it
meant. In contrast to an earlier shift in the meaning of security of
supply from its initial unlimited extraction to the strategic ‘small
gas ﬁeld policy’, which resulted in equal measure from economic
and security of supply reasoning (Section 4), this redeﬁned under-
standing stems primarily from a security debate. A debate that
resulted in an adaptation of the Dutch security of supply under-
standing away from economic gain towards a focus on the minimal
extraction necessary for a continuation of energy demand within
the existing sociotechnical infrastructure.
Lastly, the debate nuances the discursive nature of security,
something that comes across most strongly in the idea in Secu-
ritization Theory that security is ‘a self-referential practice’ ([14] p.
24) and that threats are always imaginary (as they have not hap-
pened yet) and hence have no material standing. As Van Wijk and
Fischhendler ([37] p. 22 quoting Adam and Van Loon, 2000) argue
5 This can be read as implying that safety concerns about energy production are
not  part of energy security itself, which I would argue against in line with the focus
on the social/environmental acceptability of vital energy systems. Here, however,
I  make an analytical distinction to better contrast the positions of the two parties
(which together with the choice for speciﬁc spokespersons is another analytical


































































of which about 20 could be felt by inhabitants (out of 133 total
in the Netherlands: [40]). Within the debate on the gasquakes in
Groningen, the Huizinge earthquake thus acts as a turning point.
6 All translations from Dutch are by the author, but I am grateful to the editors
and reviewers for offering a better translation of this term.
7 The Netherlands has a framework that distributes the legal ownership, extrac-
tion rights and proﬁt sharing between the Dutch state and the companies involved,
through a range of legal entities and subsidiaries, which nowadays is bundled under
the heading het Gasgebouw (see for example [87]). In this tight network, Shell and
ExxonMobil have the license to operate the Groningen natural gas ﬁeld through their
ownership of the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM). Both also own shares
of  GasTerra, the company responsible for the sale of the natural gas. The Dutch state
(read the Ministry of Economic Affairs) pulls its weight through a legal entity called
EBN. The NAM and EBN both cooperate in and own the Maatschap Groningen, which
is  responsible for the actual exploitation of the natural gas ﬁelds. The Dutch state
also owns shares of GasTerra both directly (via the Ministry of Finance) and indi-
rectly (through EBN). All in all, the Dutch Safety Board ([21] p. 8, 75, 88) concludes
that,  through these constructions and the close personal connections between the
boards of GasTerra and the Maatschap Groningen, the decision-making on Dutch
natural gas is made in a closed system that is effectively owned by Shell, ExxonMo-
bil and the Dutch State: a system devoid of opposition and ruled by ten persons at
most.
8 Although not the strongest ever experienced in the Netherlands (a natural earth-
quake in Roermond 1992), and not nearly close to the magnitude of some of the
recent US shale gas induced earthquakes. The Richter scale is logarithmic and with
its  magnitude highlights the energy released. Everything below 3 on the Richter
scale is hardly perceptible. That said, the actual experienced magnitude depends on
multiple factors (energy released, wave speed, ground conditions, force, duration,
depth, and so on), not all of which relate one on one to the earthquakes in Groningen.J. Kester / Energy Research &
n relation to risk: ‘the question of whether risk is genuine or not is
rrelevant. What matters instead is the actualisation of risk in pol-
cy processes in general . . ..’  Yet even when agreeing that threats
re imaginary, the gasquake debate also offers two  ways in which
aterial elements played an active role. On the one hand, the sup-
ort for the safety claims of the local population grew with the
angible experience of ever more and stronger gasquakes. In time
t was accepted that the qasquakes threatened local lives and liveli-
oods (a clear sharable referent object even with those not directly
hreatened), that a reduction of extraction volumes was  an effective
if not the only) solution, and most of all that the causal relation-
hip between extraction, gasquakes and increasing damage was
ndisputable ([17] p. 74). On the other hand, the security of supply
nderstanding has always been closely related to the existing gas
nfrastructure in the Netherlands. It is the existing infrastructure,
ncluding the conversion and extraction capacity and the gas ﬁred
oilers (with resulting demand for gas), and the expected rate of
hange of that infrastructure, which offers the boundaries of mini-
um extraction capacity and thereby the current boundary of the
ocal safety claim.
In other words, the debate highlights the need for security
cholars to focus on the interaction between threat images, mate-
ial events and especially the knowledge practices that mediate
etween these two. Contrary to the facilitating conditions that
ecuritization Theory offers, where material elements are subject
o security ([14][14] p. 33), this paper places them in a ﬂat rela-
ional ontology that equalizes them to security images. Such a ﬂat
elational ontology is proposed in the ﬁeld which by lack of a bet-
er term is called ‘new materialism’ [19–21]. Scholars in this broad
eld have long been uneasy with a sole focus on linguistic expla-
ations in constructivist work, while not willing to refer back to
ore traditional realist and objectivist approaches as these lose
he performative insight that our shared social understandings of
he world help shape it. While I prefer the work of Barad and Fou-
ault, for simplicity’s sake and the intent of this special issue I will
se the indicative and very popular relational alternative offered by
ctor-Network Theory (ANT) [22,23]. This theory depicts the world
o exist out of networks of nodes, which themselves are networks,
nd so on. These networks are irreducible and ﬂat, meaning that one
hould not and cannot prefer one element over another. Whether
hat element is a social explanation (energy security), something
aterial (a gas well), a law or a newspaper article, all these ele-
ents together form our current world. Importantly, as each node
xists out of their own networks, theoretically, if any of these nodes
s missing, the world is not the same. In other words, security claims
nd images are only one element out of many and they only have
heir speciﬁc meaning as part of a broader ‘security apparatus’([29];
.f. [38]). As Latour summarizes the goal of ANT: ‘It simply means
ot to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human
ntentional action and a material world of causal relations ([22] p.
6).’ Instead of assuming who acts (the speech actor) the idea is to
ctually study who acts by observing the traces that are left when
elations change (the damage after an gasquake, a changed inter-
retation in reports, a new scientiﬁc model, etc.). Luckily, the core
ssumption is that networks are constantly changing and that sta-
ility is actually a product of hard work. In this sense, a security
rgument is the associative work done to create some semblance
f stability in an ever-changing environment.
The reading below shows how the local inhabitants, the Grun-
ingers in their dialect, here represented by the Groninger Bodem
eweging (GBB, which translates as Groningen Ground Movement),
ave been increasingly successful in securitizing the gasquakes as threat to their livelihood. They have managed to put the induced
arthquakes on the political agenda with a sense of urgency, while
chieving a reduction in gas extraction and an increase in mon-
tary compensation. The lesson however is that they were notl Science 24 (2017) 12–20 15
believed until the number of measurements increased – which only
occurred after repeated security claims – nor granted their urgency
until the materiality of the gasquakes became visible through those
measurements and material effects. Just calling for the threat of
the gasquakes had little effect, as shown by the duration of the
debate, but including the scientiﬁc uncertainty in those safety argu-
ments ultimately did. Especially, as the uncertainty led to more
seismographs, which led to more measured gasquakes, thereby
strengthening the claims of the local population. Simultaneously,
one can witness within government and industry a debate geared
towards the weighing of the beneﬁts of natural gas extraction and
the risk and consequences of these earthquakes. For these insti-
tutions, the debate itself hardly changed so much as the numbers
and valuation behind them. Consequently, these assessments (the
weighing of security of supply, safety and proﬁt) and the uncer-
tainty behind the scientiﬁc knowledge over these tremors lie at
the core of the struggle between the local population and the
gas-industrial complex (het Gasgebouw)6: the small and closely
connected group of companies and institutions in charge of Dutch
natural gas extraction.7
3. The Huizinge earthquake and subsequent reactions
With a score of 3.6 on the Richter scale, the Huizinge earth-
quake of 16 August 2012 was  the strongest ever experienced in
the Groningen area.8 To understand its impact, it is necessary to
place it in the ongoing debate on the potential relation between
gas extraction and earthquakes. This includes the history that the
Grunningers have with an increasing number of such earthquakes,
which also have been of steadily higher magnitude (see Fig. 1), and
their struggle for acknowledgement of these quakes. Moreover, it
includes the public pressure that resulted a year later from the
news that 2013 turned out to be a record year. Both in terms of an
exceptionally high extraction volume (up to 54 billion Nm3: [39]),
with subsequent revenues, and a record number of 119 tremorsIn  particular, the minimal depth between 1 and 3 km, the ground conditions (clay,
high ground water levels) and the fast speed of the ground waves mean that people
experience them earlier than the Richter scale would indicate. Other complicating
factors are the uncertainty within the Richter scale itself (+− 0,1) and the delay of
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ot only because its magnitude and subsequent public attention
ade the Grunningers start to protest in earnest (while allowing
hem a media platform), but also because it turned out to be the
vent that made ofﬁcials acknowledge the need for a shift in their
alues. In this respect, the unsolicited report of the State Supervi-
ion of Mines (SSM) in response to the Huizinge earthquake [41]
urned out especially important.
As the ofﬁcial supervisory body, the SSM is responsible to ensure
hat any mining activities in the Netherlands are in accordance
ith the mining law [42]. Even though the Huizinge earthquake fell
elow the maximum of 3.9 on the Richter scale that was  calculated
n earlier risk assessments, the SSM initiated a study in response to
he growing unrest under the local population ([41]; see also [24] p.
6; [43]). In this unsolicited report, the SSM, until 2015 still part of
he Ministry of Economic Affairs (and thus part of the gas-industrial
omplex), openly and strongly questions the constant adjustments
nd increases in the maximum magnitude that risk assessments
ave put forward since the early 1990s. The SSM combined this with
arlier discussions on methodological uncertainties (see Section
), and, for the ﬁrst time, put these uncertainties upfront. Subse-
uently, it concluded that it is impossible to estimate a possible
aximum magnitude for the induced earthquakes in Groningen,
ven going so far as to take a magnitude of 5.0 as a valid possibility.
o prevent this, it advised the Minister of Economic Affairs to reduce
he output of the Groningen gas ﬁeld as quickly and drastically as
ossible.
The SSM’s shift came as a surprise for the other parties within the
as-industrial complex ([24] p. 77) and its advise was  not imme-
iately accepted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Instead the
inister called for more research on the relation and effects of the
arthquakes and the gas extraction (15 different studies in total,
mong them one on the minimal level needed to uphold security
f supply, see: [44]). He did this, even though he acknowledged the
hance for higher magnitude quakes and agreed with the NAM on
 sum of 100 million euros for preventive construction measures
45–48]. The SSM report meanwhile inﬂuenced the sub-national
rovince of Groningen to initiate its own study, which repeated
he main conclusions of the SSM and thereby conﬁrmed the local
oncerns. The local population, in turn, used these reports in their
rotests [45,49].
Late 2013 the debate heated up once more following the range
f reports requested by the Minister, which conﬁrmed many of the
oncerns voiced up to that moment, as well as the news that 2013
urned out to be a record year [39,40,50–52]. This time the gov-
rnment heeded the concerns and decided on a range of issues.
hese included, among others, the organization of an open dialogue
mong all affected private and public parties [53]. The government
lso tasked the NAM to conduct a full-scale below ground survey
which was missing so far) and to reduce the extraction in the most
ffected clusters (while making up for the losses in other clusters).
imultaneously, it increased construction standards and preventa-
ive measures, while also improving the administrative procedures
ehind the compensation claims. And it offered the region an over-
ll package to improve its economic and employment perspectives
54]. These measures were reinforced in the winter of 2014–2015,
t which point the Minister of Economic Affairs initiated a ﬁrst pro-
isional cap on the total gas extraction from the Groningen ﬁeld,
hich has since been extended [55,56].
. Balancing security of supply, proﬁts and the impacts of
asquakesEven though the Ministry of Economic Affairs reduced produc-
ion at speciﬁc clusters and initiated a cap on the total extracted
olume, there remains a strong political debate about the installa-al Science 24 (2017) 12–20
tion of permanent extraction quotas. Currently, the safety concerns
of the Grunningers are acknowledged. However, the parties respon-
sible for gas extraction are arguing that they are bound to produce
whatever is needed in response to contractual and seasonal
demand from the Dutch consumers and the European countries
that have bought Groningen gas on long term contracts, and as
such cannot limit themselves by installing a deﬁnite extraction cap
[25,56].
For instance, in its 2013 reaction to the reports from the SSM and
other institutes on the Huizinge Earthquake the ministry argued
that:
In the near future, the Groningen gas extraction cannot be
substituted by gas imports or other measures. A diminished
availability of the Groningen natural gas will have serious
consequences for the Dutch society and the societies in our
surrounding countries ([46] p. 4).
Likewise in 2015, after the initial decision to cap the volume, the
ministry stated that:
The consequences of long term gas extraction in Groningen have
become increasingly clear in recent years. . . . Simultaneously,
the gas extraction is of essential importance for the energy sup-
ply in the Netherlands. Both the mixture of the gas and the fact
that the gas from Groningen, due to its size, can be used ﬂexi-
bly, makes that a reduction from the Groningen gas ﬁeld could
lead to problems with the heating of buildings or other usages. In
addition, for multiple decades the gas extraction is an important
source of income for the Dutch state ([57] p. 4).
This position has since been conﬁrmed – but simultaneously
limited − with a ruling from the highest administrative court in
the Netherlands [58,59]. In its ruling, the court argued that in the
assessment of the balance between the safety of the local pop-
ulation and security of supply (which the court deﬁnes as the
low-caloriﬁc natural gas needed to comply with the demand for
this type of gas) the Minister had not explained why he chose the
demand from a harsh winter scenario that Gasunie Transport Ser-
vices B.V. (GTS) calculated as the benchmark for the minimal supply
needed [44]. As such, the court considered that the lowest minimal
production was not 30 bn. Nm3  as favored by Economic Affairs, but
that it should follow a more average scenario of 27 bn. Nm3 (with
upward allowances for harsh winters).
This debate can be placed in an energy security context where
the role of gas is already shifting for the Netherlands. Before
the 1960s, the Dutch did not experience gas insecurity, simply
because the level of gas consumption was  minimal. Nowadays, the
Netherlands is highly gas dependent, but not seen as gas insecure
because most of its gas is extracted domestically. With the draining
of the Groningen gas ﬁeld and other Dutch natural gas reserves this
is expected to change. In the near future, the Dutch will be gas inse-
cure precisely because they have come to rely on it. Similarly, while
the Netherlands is one of the least dependent European countries
on Russian gas, it does import Russian gas and expects to increase
its imports in the future to balance the reduction (and capping)
of its emptying domestic ﬁelds – negatively inﬂuencing its secu-
rity of supply position. To counter this position in the post-gas era,
the Dutch state has launched an ambitious strategy to become the
“gas roundabout” of North-Western Europe, combining its central
position and the empty gas ﬁelds as its natural storage facilities
[60]. This gas roundabout idea aims to proﬁt from the material
(empty gas ﬁelds, pipelines and pumping and conversion capac-
ity), legal (national and European long-term contract law and other
regulations) and social (knowledgeable and inﬂuential gas elites)
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It is especially the latter social framework and the practices
esulting from it that the Dutch Safety Board describes as encum-
ering the incorporation of the everyday safety of individual
itizens in the gas extraction decisions. The board describes the
veryday decision-making of these organizations as driven by three
ain paradigms: (1) maximum proﬁts and winnings, (2) an optimal
nd strategic use of the natural resources, and (3) a continuity of
utch gas supplies for both citizens and industry ([24] pp. 70–71;
omparable: [51] p. 4). All three are captured in the 1974 small ﬁelds
olicy that replaced the initial unstructured pumping of gas in the
arly 1960s with a more strategic and economic long term vision,
ased on an optimal development of new small gas ﬁelds by giv-
ng those ﬁelds priority on the Dutch gas market while using the
roningen ﬁeld more sparingly as a swing ﬁeld to fulﬁll the rest of
emand [61]. In addition, the board also concludes that ‘all efforts
ithin the gas-industrial complex are aimed towards an imper-
eptible extraction of natural gas’ ([24]p. 74). Together these four
axims for a long time structured the everyday practices within
he gas-industrial complex towards the Groningen natural gas ﬁeld.
mportantly, they exclude the safety and insecurity concerns of the
ocals, except as a condition to be met  for the other goals ([24] p.
1; [62]). This, in turn, preconditioned the initial response from
he organizations to claims of insecurity by locals, and it explains
hy these responses, for a long time, have been soothing instead
f informative and why they only followed the scientiﬁc updates
f the magnitude – without repeating the mentioned uncertainties
nd knowledge gaps ([24] pp. 81–82, 86).
Up until the debate following the SSM report, the gasquakes
ere considered an externality of the gas extraction, to be paid off
hrough damage payments. Security of supply arguments simply
eant business as usual and an optimal utilization of the Dutch gas
elds. With the SSM report and the increasing pressure of the Grun-
ingers, media and other parties (like local governments, safety
egions, environmental groupings, and so on), the discussion for
he gas-industrial complex shifted to more extensive compensatory
easures and mitigation practices, while opening up the question
hen precisely the Netherlands would be gas secure? Looking back,
he gasquake protests and subsequent shift from the SSM and other
nowledge institutes forced the government to look closer at its
nderstanding of security of supply. In doing so, it renewed its
ecurity of supply considerations that structure the energy debates
n the Netherlands, but this time interpreted it no longer in eco-
omic or strategic terms, but in terms of a minimal gas extraction.
he minimal extraction that is required to fulﬁll expected demand
ithin the current sociotechnical gas infrastructure including the
echnical capacity to deliver this through alternative means.
. Calling on safety concerns and scientiﬁc uncertainty to
ecuritize the gasquakes
The local inhabitants above the Groningen gas ﬁeld do not
rimarily deal with energy security concerns, contractual obliga-
ions and other risk assessments. Instead, they deal with a steady
ncrease in frequency and magnitude of induced earthquakes
aused by the natural gas extraction, a reluctant acknowledgement
f the causality between extraction, quakes and damages, the dif-
culties in getting their direct and indirect earthquake damages
eimbursed, decreasing house prices, a soothing communication
y the gas-industrial complex and the perceived unequal distri-
ution of the gas beneﬁts ([63–65], [66] pp. 7–9). These grievances
nd concerns are being voiced through media channels, legal proce-
ures and letters of complaint to ofﬁcial institutions both regionally
like the safety region of Groningen and municipalities which in
urn also started to petition) and nationally (the SSM, parliament,
he Minister of Economic Affairs, and other regulatory and polit-l Science 24 (2017) 12–20 17
ical institutions). In addition, the street protests grew in number
and size to gatherings of hundreds of people late 2014 [67]. These
protests mainly focused on three claims. First, an overall demand
for more attention and acceptance of the urgency of their problems
with banners like ‘Groningen a ticking time bomb’ [68]. Second,
especially later in the debate, showcasing their distrust towards the
gas-industrial complex and in particular the NAM and the Minister
of Economic Affairs with banners like ‘Groningen tremors, but The
Hague will quiver’ [69]. And of course, the need to prevent further
gasquakes by calling for a reduction of gas extraction, with ban-
ners reading ‘Kamp Gas Terug Nu’, calling on Kamp, the minister of
Economic Affairs, to take his foot of the gas throttle [70].
Obviously, some Grunningers have been aware of the gasquakes
since the early 1990s and have tried to make themselves heard over
time, either as individuals (see [71] on Van der Sluis; or more recent
[72]) or through well-organized associations like the Groninger
Ground Movement [63,73] or the more activist Shocking Gronin-
gen [74]. Looking back earlier into the debate it is illustrative that
it took 7 years and a large interdisciplinary study after the ﬁrst
earthquake in 1986 for the government and the NAM to ofﬁcially
acknowledge that the quakes were directly linked to the gas extrac-
tion [75]. Until that study in 1993, the NAM ridiculed any claims
from individuals and organizations that proposed such a link [71].
Once recognized, it took another 20 years for the ofﬁcial parties to
start taking the risks and potential consequences of these induced
earthquakes serious enough to adapt their extraction volumes. In
those 20 years, every couple of years NAM, government and knowl-
edge institutes have been forced to increase their estimates on the
frequency and magnitude of potential quakes.
This eventful material reality and the decades of uncertain
knowledge claims that accompany it (only reinforced by the slow
response and delaying tactics of the gas-industrial complex since
the Huizinge earthquake [76]) have led to feelings of insecurity
and distrust [66]. That it took until 2013 for the uncertainty behind
the earthquakes to become widespread public knowledge, can be
explained, so the argument goes, by the idea that the Grunningers
were loyal and felt a sense of pride for helping the country to
develop as whole ([45] p. 21). Something that slowly changed in
time with the constant adjustment of the risk analyses and max-
imum magnitude of the earthquakes. In their search for answers,
ever more people started to read the actual reports. They called on
the uncertainty itself – in depth – in their letters of complaint to
ofﬁcial institutions, for example to parliament (see [77]). The SSM
report can be described as a turning point in this respect as well, as
it not only informed the gas-industrial complex on the uncertainty
in the analyses used so far, but also supported and legitimized ear-
lier readings of the Grunningers. As Van der Voort & Vanclay argue:
‘[t]he publication of the SSM report was an impact in itself with
people becoming more anxious about what will happen to them
(2015, p. 8).’ With the report and the media attention following it,
a broader group of people learned that there was no certainty in
store for them. What is more, the subsequent decision of the Min-
ister of Economic Affairs to not directly follow the advice from the
SSM gave the local population further ammunition and a clear focus
for their grievances.
One of the largest and most organized interest groups is the GBB,
which is actively lobbying, securitizing and litigating against the
gas-industrial complex. In terms of security of supply, the GBB has
constantly maintained that ‘the extraction is reduced or halted until
independent research shows at what level extraction can take place
safely and securely ([78] p. 4).’ More important, ‘if “safe extraction”
is technical impossible, the GBB demands a total halt to the gas
extraction ([63] p. 1)’. The GBB, together with other interested par-
ties, made this tangible in their appeal to the highest administrative
court in the Netherlands [79]. Building on their earlier call that the
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ot sufﬁciently substantiated the decision to cap the gas extraction.
t based its decisions on the certainties it had (the budgetary neces-
ity of the gas beneﬁts and security of supply), as opposed to the
any uncertainties that accompany the gas extraction ([62] p. 7).
uring the hearing, they called for a preferred reduction to 12 bn.
m3, which the SSM in 2013 argued was a safe extraction level
43], only accepting 21 bn. Nm3  if practical circumstances (read
inimal security of supply and international contractual obliga-
ions) dictated otherwise in line with the bottom bandwidth of the
TS [44] report. Although they were unhappy with the legal rul-
ng which conﬁrmed the prevalence of security of supply concerns
nd set the level at 27 bn. Nm3  [80], the second options shows that
he GBB is forced to accept security of supply as a primary consid-
ration in the debate. In other words, while the local population
oes not primarily discuss the gasquakes in terms of security of
upply, the governments’ security of supply considerations are a
onstant absent presence in their claims for recognition, safety and
 reduction of natural gas extraction.
. The politics behind the gasquake science
Behind the debate on the minimal extraction volume, lies the
ack of knowledge over the tremors; both in terms of the availabil-
ty of seismographs to actually monitor them and in terms of the
ncertainty of the scientiﬁc models that are used to analyze and
redict the gasquakes. In this respect, the Groningen gas debate
hows (1) that what is not monitored and measured cannot be
nown, (2) that researchers had little incentives to work on the
ncertainties in their models, especially (3) when the institutions
sing and sponsoring the results are happy with the outcomes. For
he argument of this paper, the debate shows that the decision to
onitor is just as political as the decision to cap the extraction.
eaning that these decisions are heavily inﬂuenced by the inter-
sts and (energy) security positions of the parties involved, while
imultaneously the parties feel justiﬁed in their positions by the
ubsequent outcomes of the studies.
The only reason why the 1986 earthquake near Assen, a town
ust below the Province of Groningen with its own small gas ﬁeld,
as identiﬁed as an earthquake, contrary to other orally reported
air” tremors [65], was because it was strong enough to be picked
p by the sensors of the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institu-
ion (KNMI) in the middle of the country. One of the main results
f the debate that followed was that the Dutch Parliament inﬂu-
nced the Minister of Economic Affairs to order the KNMI – for
hich the earthquake was unexplainable as it lacked any data – to
nstall a number of seismographs around the Assen ﬁeld in 1989
nd around the Groningen ﬁeld in 1992 [45,64,65,81]. This brings
p the question whether the start of Fig. 1 resulted from the ﬁrst
rue Groninger gasquake or was actually a result of the capacity to
onitor them.
Either way, new waves of attention and research followed,
mong others in 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2009
ue to both earthquakes and regulatory changes. Of these, 2004 is
f interest on two accounts. First, because the NAM for the ﬁrst
ime publicly acknowledged that the maximum magnitude could
e corrected if necessary, thereby implying that these cannot be
stimated upfront. And second, because the 2004 KNMI report not
nly increased the maximum magnitude to 3.9 after an update of its
atabase, but also acknowledged that it was using static models for
 situation that was not static (as the earthquakes result from shift-
ng levels of gas extraction). However, it stated that it simply lacked
he tools and sub-surface information to cope with the ﬂuctuating
as extraction and its relation with the induced earthquakes ([82] ;
ee also [83]; for a similar study after the Huizinge earthquake; or
he [75] report for a predecessor).al Science 24 (2017) 12–20
It took until the Huizinge earthquake and the report by the
SSM for the number of studies to increase dramatically (as did
the number of seismographs and thereby the number of previously
undetected gasquakes). Many of these reports were commissioned
as part of the large interdisciplinary study on the gas chain by
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which was  receiving conﬂicting
advice from the parties involved. Before 2013, Economic Affairs
relied on the reports of the KNMI and other knowledge institutes
and it expected these reports to be paid for by the NAM after its
legal obligation to take the necessary safety precautions. However,
as the Dutch Safety Board concludes, the NAM, as the exploiter most
knowledgeable of the gas ﬁelds, welcomed the results from these
reports that the earthquakes would only have a minimum impact
and hence saw no cause to order additional studies on the uncer-
tainties mentioned in the reports ([24] pp. 65–66). It also took the
semi-independent SSM until 2012 to put forward the uncertainties
behind the scientiﬁc models and risk assessments.
With the NAM unwilling to study the scientiﬁc uncertainties, the
Ministry passively relying on advice and the SSM (and other expert
councils) conﬁrming the ofﬁcial reports, there was  little incentive
for the KNMI and other knowledge institutes to build alternative
models. They tried, in part by looking at international research, but
then quickly ran in to the unique material qualities of the Gronin-
gen gas ﬁeld (see note 3; [24] p. 64). What remained were the
static models and their outcomes, which ‘focused on the number,
the estimated maximum magnitude ([24] p. 63).’ In the end, this
focus on the number worked both ways. It simpliﬁed matters for
the gas-industrial complex as it constantly reinforced their posi-
tion that the gasquakes did not pose a safety concern, but over
time also fueled the distrust and uncertainty of the Grunningers
for whom the message not to worry contrasted with the constant
adjustments and their experience of the actual earthquakes. The
2013 SSM report in this sense is interesting as it shows the impor-
tance of reﬂexivity within an energy security and safety debate, in
particular the acknowledgement that security of supply still needs
a value judgement. Clearly, the Grunningers with their focus on
safety (and their search for answers) judged this threshold differ-
ently than the gas-industrial complex that looked at the balance
between costs, proﬁts, legal obligations and security of supply.
7. Reﬂection
The Groningen gasquake debate offers an example of a secu-
rity debate in a developed country that puts security of supply
considerations in the context of human security arguments. The
analysis builds on the interaction between three lines of enquiry.
First, it takes seriously the material reality of the earthquakes,
their impacts, but also the gas ﬁeld itself and the infrastructure
around it, which keeps the debate localized (no earthquakes outside
Groningen) and situated in a Northern-European market through
its pipelines at the same time. Second, it highlights the politics
over these earthquakes in terms of their origin and their potential
impact, as well as the knowledge politics related to the scien-
tiﬁc uncertainty of the models behind the earthquakes and their
future trends. Third, it illustrates the struggle by the Grunningers
to attribute a sense of urgency to both the materiality of the earth-
quakes and their future uncertainty. While successful, the above
also shows that the local population could not escape the assess-
ments of the gas-industrial complex.
In fact, in order to break with the conservative force stem-
ming from an unreﬂective use of security of supply and in order
to increase the audience acceptance of their safety claim, the local
population needed, ﬁrstly (and ironically), the frequency and mag-
nitude of the earthquakes as well as the visibility of their impact.
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ncertainties in the reports, slowly convincing neighbors and local
uthorities and then media, semi-regulatory institutions, and so on.
hirdly, once the SSM accepted the claim and published the report
hat legitimized the safety claim, the focus shifted to the decisions
f the Minister of Economic Affairs. Initially the decision not to act,
hereafter to the decision about the level at which the natural gas
xtraction was  capped. That said, while deciding to wait, the min-
ster did already demand the report from the GTS on the minimal
ecurity of supply levels indicating an early acceptance to review
he Dutch security of supply position.
In reﬂection, this illustration highlights the importance of a
ontextual understanding of security of supply. Throughout the
ebate, the gas-industrial complex slowly increased its willingness
o accept and compensate for the consequences of the gas extrac-
ion. It was not until it had compromised on all most all aspects of
he gas supply chain that it was willing to consider a closer look at
he meaning of security of supply and reduce the extracted volume
or safety concerns. Similarly, the case shows that while the Grun-
ingers call for a further reduction, they ultimately take a pragmatic
egal stance towards a minimum extraction volume based on secu-
ity of supply considerations. The debate thus centered on the
eaning of security of supply as it relates to the low caloriﬁc nat-
ral gas of the Groningen gas ﬁeld, the estimated demand and the
vailable technical capacity to substitute the Groningen gas. From
 security perspective, however, the local population through their
esistance against the gas extraction practices helped reify the prin-
iple of security of supply. Even though their concerns ﬁt a potential
ider understanding of human energy security, they never really
uccessfully questioned the security of supply principles behind
he decision-making processes. Consequently, security of supply
as been reproduced while it structured the debate by setting the
utermost boundaries of acceptable actions and reductions. That
aid, it has not been reproduced the same: the gasquakes have chal-
enged the Dutch notion of security of supply, with natural gas no
onger seen as a silent and bountiful resource but as a necessity to
hich the country is addicted.
From this we can draw three lessons. First, the need to study
he use of security and threat images in their wider context. This
hould include the sociotechnical energy infrastructure, material
ausal events, and especially how security practices relate to other
nowledge practices that are used to make sense of these events.
econd, besides the insight that people who use security language
re morally responsible for the distinctions they make, the agenda
etting power they exert and the resources that are drawn from
ther options, there is the lesson that security is simultaneously
bout urgency and conservation. It is about protecting and con-
erving a certain situation, except that it always fails as security
hanges things itself. Protecting the existing gas extraction volumes
ad clear impacts, just as arguing for the safety and living stan-
ards had an impact on the actual gas extraction. Security is never
tatic and the search for the deﬁnition of what energy security is
an therefore only be described as an active political intervention
tself. Energy security scholars should be aware of this and not only
tudy “new” security threats or categorize old ones, but explicitly
ocus on existing energy security practices, their distinctions and
he constant renegotiation and hard work that keep them stable.
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